Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James R. Black, Mary R. Rudolph; Black & Moore; Laura Boyer; attorney for appellant.
Stephen G. Morgan, Mark L. Anderson; Morgan, Scalley & Reading; Allen M. Swan; Kirotn,
McConkie & Bushnell; attorneys for respondents.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, No. 880031.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1900
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 
DOCKE^NO, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES HORNSBY, 
Appellant-Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah corporation sole, 
CHARLES GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON, 
and JOHN DOES I through X, 
inclusive, 
Respondents-Defendants. 
Appeal From 
Third District Court, 
Honorable Timothy Hanson 
District Court Judge 
No. C-83-5019 
n
 v - ^ 0 7 1 
* U w %J <y JL 
Utah Supreme Court 
No. 860007 
(Argument Priority No. /^ r ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
James R. Black, #0357 
Mary A. Rudolph, #4245 
BLACK & MOORE 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant-
Plaintiff 
Laura Boyer, #3767 
Attorney at Law 
3167 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Attorney for Appellant-
Plaintiff 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Mark L. Anderson 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents-
Defendants 
Allen M. Swan 
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents-
Defendants 
rpn fa ! |F 
€& % ^ 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES HORNSBY, 
Appellant-Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah corporation sole, 
CHARLES GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON, 
and JOHN DOES I through X, 
inclusive, 
Respondents-Defendants. 
Appeal From 
Third District Court, 
Honorable Timothy Hanson 
District Court Judge 
No. C-83-5019 
Utah Supreme Court 
No. 860007 
(Argument Priority No. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
James R. Black, #0357 
Mary A. Rudolph, #4245 
BLACK & MOORE 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant-
Plaintiff 
Laura Boyer, #3767 
Attorney at Law 
3167 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Attorney for Appellant-
Plaintiff 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Mark L. Anderson 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents-
Defendants 
Allen M. Swan 
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents-
Defendants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Pflg.e 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
POINT I: IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT JUDGE TO REFUSE TO VOIR 
DIRE THE JURY ON MATTERS INVOLVING 
THEIR POTENTIALLY PREJUDICIAL 
INVOLVEMENT WITH THE DEFENDANT 
LDS CHURCH 
POINT II: 
POINT III: 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR 
DEFENSE COUNSEL TO REFER 
CLIENT AS THE WELFARE FARM 
TO ALLOW 
TO HIS 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT JUDGE TO REFUSE TO GIVE 
AN INSTRUCTION ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR . . 9 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR BY REFUSING TO 
GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY ON 
NEGLIGENCE PER SE 13 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE A STRICT LIABILITY INSTRUCTION 
IN THIS CASE 14 
CONCLUSION 16 
ADDENDA 19 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Anderton vs. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Utah 1980) 
at 833 12 
Ballow v. Monrow. 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985) 11 
Casev v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 
MD 595, 143 A2d 627 (1958) 5 
Flynn,..v. Lindenfield, 6 AZ App. 
459, 433 P.2d 639 (1967) 15 
Kusy v.. K-Mart. Apparel Fashion Corp., 
681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984) 10 
Macho v. Mahowald, 374 NW 2d 312 
(Minn. app. 1985) 14 
State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 
(Utah 1984) 7 
United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451 
(U.S. Ct. Appeals, 10th C i r c , 1985) 7 
Viaue v. Noves, 113 AZ 236, 550 P.2d 
234 (AZ 1976) 14 
Watzig v. Tobin, 292 or 645, 655 
642 P.2d 651 (1982) 12 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
P.aq,e 
47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §283-5 5 
57 Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence, §239 (p. 622) 13 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §509 et. seq 14 
Salt Lake County, Section 10-10-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES HORNSBY, 
Appellant-Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah corporation sole, 
CHARLES GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON, 
and JOHN DOES I through X, 
inclusive, 
Respondents-Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal From 
Third District Court, 
Honorable Timothy Hanson 
District Court Judge 
No. C-83-5019 
Utah Supreme Court 
No. 860007 
(Argument Priority No. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was it reversible error for the trial court judge to 
refuse to voir dire the jury on their interest in defendant LDS 
Church? 
2. Was it reversible error to allow defense counsel to 
refer to his client as the welfare farm? 
3. Was it reversible error for the trial court judge to 
refuse to give an instruction on reg ipsa loquitur to the jury? 
4. Did the trial court judge commit reversible error by 
refusing to give instructions to the jury on negligence per s_e? 
5« Did the trial court judge commit reversible error in 
refusing to give a strict liability instruction in this case? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS 
This lawsuit was initiated to recover personal injury 
damages sustained by plaintiff, James Hornsby (hereinafter 
referred to as Hornsby) when he laid down his motorcycle in 
order to avoid hitting a cow that had escaped while defendant was 
attempting to load livestock on a truck. The case was heard 
before Judge Timothy R. Hanson in Third Judicial District Court, 
State of Utah, by a seven-person jury for a period of four days 
(October 29 through November 1, 1985). After fifty minutes of 
deliberation, the jury found the defendants zero (0%) percent 
negligent and plaintiff 100% negligent in causing the accident. 
From that jury verdict and a judgment of no cause of action, 
comes this appeal. 
The_facts in material part are that on March 30, 1983, at 
5:40 p.m., James Hornsby was operating his motorcycle easterly on 
2820 South approximately 7975 West, City of Magna, County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, when a cow, owned by defendant Corporation of 
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (hereinafter referred to as "LDS Church"), darted out from 
behind a fence into his pathway. (R. 822, 823.) To avoid hitting 
the cow (which he avoided by inches, R. 569), Hornsby applied 
his brakes and then laid down his bike in the road. In doing so, 
he incurred severe physical injuries. 
The cow was one of two that had, earlier escaped from the 
LDS Church welfare farm (R. 677) onto defendant John Sutton1 s 
property. The two cattle remained at the Sutton property during 
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March 1983 until their removal would not disturb Sutton1s cattle. 
(R. 632, 643-646). On March 30, 1983, the LDS Church agent, 
Charles Giblett, went to retrieve the cattle. Because the LDS 
Church trailer was broken, they used Mr. Sutton1s horse trailer. 
(R. 548.) Mr. Sutton had never before used his trailer to load 
and/or transfer any cattle. (R. 554.) 
Before backing the trailer to the corral, Mr. Sutton opened 
the only gate from his property leading to 2820 South. The gate 
was left open during the loading procedure for Mr. Sutton's 
convenience. (R. 553, 635.) The Sutton trailer was designed to 
be loaded by chute. Mr. Sutton acknowledged that there would be 
a smaller possibility of an animal escaping if the trailer had 
been used as designed. (R. 559.) He nonetheless chose to back 
the trailer to the corral gate. He then attached the gate to the 
trailer. (R. 555, 557.) 
Mr. Sutton used bailing wire to secure the trailer to the 
corral gate during loading. No inspection was made of the wire 
before its use. (R. 599.) He couldnft recall if he used a hook 
on the gate to secure it. Mr. Sutton expressed uncertainty as to 
how the cow escaped. He did not express an opinion as to whether 
the wire broke or merely came loose. (R. 591, 596, 598.) The 
animal did escape, however, and gained access to the road, where 
the accident took place, through the gate Mr. Sutton had left 
open. (R. 598.) 
The cow had been loose for at least an hour before the 
accident occurred. (R. 612.) During that hour there was no 
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organized plan to contain this cow other than to herd the cow 
back across the road (2820 South) to Sutton's property. (R. 647, 
584, 612.) While the cow was on and about the road, the acci-
dent occurred. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant argues that the jury verdict in this case was 
against the undisputed evidence and should be overturned. The 
trial court committed reversible error in rulings on a number of 
issues to be discussed hereinafter. First, the court refused to 
allow voir dire of the jury concerning their potential prejudicial 
involvements with the defendant church. Second, the court allowed 
defendant's counsel to refer to his client as the "welfare farm". 
Finally, the judge refused plaintiff's proposed jury instructions 
on re_s ipsa loquitor and negligence per se and strict liability. 
The jury found the defendant zero (0%) negligent. That verdict 
goes against the evidence, shows the impact of the court's trial 
errors, and is reversible as a matter of law. 
That finding of 0% neglect on the part of the defendants is 
clearly contrary to the evidence. John Sutton admitted that he 
used a horse trailer which he had never used to load cattle. (T. 
13.) He testified further that he left the upper gate opened. 
(T. 20.) The fact is, a cow, under the supervision and control of 
defendants, darted onto a public highway creating an undeniable 
hazard. The defendants had a duty to the plaintiff and others 
rightfully operating their motor vehicles on a public road to keep 
their livestock off the road. Failure to do so is negligence* 
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The plaintiff is not asking this Court to apportion negli-
gence in this case. This Court should find that the evidence did 
not support the juryfs finding that the defendants were zero (0%) 
percent negligent. As a matter of law, the defendants were 
negligent to the extent of some percentage. The jury's apportion-
ment of negligence reflects the bias and prejudice which contami-
nated this trial and the ultimate verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
JUDGE TO REFUSE TO VOIR DIRE THE JURY ON 
MATTERS INVOLVING THEIR POTENTIALLY PREJUDI-
CIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH THE DEFENDANT LDS 
CHURCH. 
It is a widely held principle that wherever a religious 
organization is a party to the litigation, the religious faith of 
the prospective juror is a proper subject of inquiry. 47 Am. 
Jur. 2d, JuryLr Section 283. 
In the Landmark case Casey vs. Roman Catholic Arch Bishop of 
Baltimore, 143 A.2d 627 (MD. 1958), the Maryland Court of Appeals 
held that in a jury trial, parties have an actual right to voir 
dire prospective jurors on their religious affiliation if it is 
"specific cause for disqualification". Id. at 631. Failure of 
the court to allow such voir dire questioning is an abuse of 
discretion constituting reversible error. 
Even beyond initial questions regarding church affiliation, 
the £&&££ court stated that: 
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. . . If the religious affiliation of a juror 
might reasonably prevent him from arriving at 
a fair and impartial verdict in a particular 
case because of the nature of the case, the 
parties are entitled to ferret it out or 
preferably, have the court discover for them, 
the existence of bias or prejudice resulting 
from such affiliation* . • A party is 
entitled to a jury free of all disqualifying 
bias or prejudice without exception and not 
merely a jury free of bias or prejudice of a 
general abstract nature. (Miles vs. U.S., 
109 U.S. 304, 1881, Jurors asked if they 
believed in the truth of Mormon teachings). 
Id. at 631. Plaintiff's counsel in the instant case should have 
been allowed to voir dire the jury regarding their affiliation 
with the defendant LDS church. (Plaintiff's requested voir dire, 
specifically numbers 38-45.) (R. 325-328.) Furthermore, to 
ferret out any bias and prejudice, counsel should have been 
allowed to question them regarding whether any attended the 
Oquirrh Stake from where the cow came; whether any of them held 
church positions, i.e. bishop; and/or whether any of them either 
volunteered at the subject farm or knew persons who had or did. 
Because of the large LDS Church population, the probability of 
a juror holding a position of leadership in the Church is great. 
Therefore, it was very likely that a juror would perceive that 
plaintiff was suing "my Church". The judge, therefore, committed 
prejudicial error by refusing to make appropriate inquiry into 
that potential perception. 
Rather than give the written instructions submitted by 
counsel, the trial court judge herein gave a general instruction 
to the effect as follows: "Would any of you find it difficult to 
be fair and impartial and render a judgment against defendant LDS 
church?" Out of the twenty-two prospective jurors, no one 
responded when asked this question. A more detailed probing as 
requested would have at least given counsel the opportunity to 
use peremptory challenges in a more considered manner. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Ball 685 P. 2d 1055 (Utah 
1984) held that this type of general question is insufficient. 
The trial judge in Ball, having no juror response when asked 
whether anyone had prejudices against people who drink, allowed 
no further questioning on the matter. Likewise, the prosecution 
considered any further questions "superfluous". In reversing the 
trial court decision, the court aptly noted that "the most 
characteristic feature of prejudice is its inability to recognize 
itself". Ld. at 1058. The Ball court recognized that a 
peremptory challenge may be predicated on group affiliation. The 
basis for the M X l decision "the detection of actual bias", is 
applicable here. Id. at 1059. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. 
&££l££j£, 776 F2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1985) found that the trial court 
provided a fair trial when it allowed a forty-four page question-
naire to be submitted to the prospective jurors asking for 
detailed information about, inter alia/ religious affiliation. 
Affleck involved the prosecution of a defendant who had defrauded 
persons affiliated with the Mormon Church. Returning a guilty 
verdict in Affleck would vindicate the rights of Mormons, and, 
therefore, the defense counsel needed to ferret out religious bias 
and prejudice against an accused. Here, a verdict finding 
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liability on the part of the defendants would be a finding 
against the Mormon Church, 
Besides knowing the defendant to be the LDS Church, the case 
at hand contained several innuendos and references to the Church* 
The following excerpts from the record demonstrate the type of 
prejudicial information that infiltrated the trial. "Mr. Sutton 
was greatly disturbed that he had to be involved in a lawsuitf 
and his "stake president" [emphasis added] told me that I should 
call him and try to explain to him what the situation was and how 
sorry we were that he was." (R. 640); Mr. Sutton and Mr. Giblett 
had a "church relationship". (R. 640.) Further, there was a 
reference to one of the "brethren" telling Giblett that Sutton had 
called. (R. 630.) 
Appellant contends that the jury in this case was biased and 
prejudiced in favor of the LDS Church and this is inferable from 
the fact that after a four-day trial of a serious personal 
injury case demanding damages in excess of $300,000, the jury only 
deliberated fifty minutes (jury retired November 1, 1985 at 4:40 
p.m. and gave verdict at 5:30 p.m.) and returned an insupportable 
verdict finding the defendants were 0% negligent and appellant 
100% negligent. This was in the face of absolute evidence of 
negligence on the part of each defendant. 
POINT II 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO ALLOW DEFENSE 
COUNSEL TO REFER TO HIS CLIENT AS THE WELFARE 
FARM. 
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It is a basic principle of American law that a party is 
entitled to a jury free of all disqualifying bias or prejudice 
without exception* The use of the word "welfare"r portraying an 
apparently penniless defendant, obviously creates a bias in favor 
of finding the defendant not liable* Further an organization 
with the apparent design to magnanimously alleviate the trials of 
penniless and helpless creates an unjust sympathy factor in a 
lawsuit such as this. In this case Judge Hanson recognized the 
likelihood of such bias and unjust sympathy. He instructed 
counsel in chambers not to refer to the fact that defendant is a 
"welfare" institution. Plaintiff's counsel refrained from 
referring to defendants as being represented by insurance 
companies. Notwithstanding the admonishment, counsel introduced 
his client Charles Giblett as the supervisor of the "Church 
Welfare Farm" known as the Oquirrh Stake Farm. (R. 544.) 
Plaintiff's counsel did not object, as not to draw the jury's 
attention to the "welfare" defendant. But, for the record and to 
prevent further references to "welfare", she brought the admonish-
ment again to the attention of the parties and the Court. 
Notwithstanding the prior order of the court counsel again, later 
in the proceedings, brought the "welfare farm" notion to the 
attention of the jury. (R. 544.) These references to the 
"welfare farm" constitute reversible error!. 
POINT III 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
JUDGE TO REFUSE TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION ON RES 
IPSA LOQUITUR. 
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Plaintiff's counsel requested the court to give a jury 
instruction on £gs ipsa loguitor. The court refused* (R. 411.) 
Recently this Court reiterated the following requirements plain-
tiff must satisfy to be entitled to an instructions on the theory 
of L£§ ipsa loquitur: 
1. That the accident was of a kind, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have 
happened had due care been observed; 
2. That the plaintiff's own use or operation 
of the agency or instrumentality was not 
primarily responsible for the injury; and 
3. That the agency or instrumentality 
causing the injury was under the exclusive 
management or control of the defendant. 
Kusv v, K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1230 (Dtah 1984). 
The court in Kusy stated that it was only necessary for the 
plaintiff to make a prima facie showing. Kusy f,s prima facie 
case was: 
1. Pallets were able to bear much greater weight than 
his own which supported the inference that the 
pallets would not have broken if due care had 
been observed; 
2. He testified he loaded the truck in the normal 
manner under manager's instructions and directions; 
and 
3* Defendant had retrieved the pallets from its own yard 
and brought them to the truck for plaintiff's use. 
The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to a res ipsa 
loquitur instruction. The court, in so finding, stated if 
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plaintiff could prove that the pallet broke and caused the fall, 
but could not point to a specific act that caused it to break, 
then the res ipsa instruction could be appropriate. 
The plaintiffs in this case did make the necessary prima 
facie showing for Las ie&a loguitor as follows: 
1. Cows do not normally escape from their enclosure in 
the absence of some negligence and that negligence 
was defendant's. 
2. Plaintiff's own use of the instrumentality was not 
the cause of the accident as he had no control over 
any part of the loading procedure; and 
3. The defendants had exclusive control of loading 
facilities which allowed this cow's escape. (R. 
634-638.) 
Plaintiff accordingly requested instructions of res ipsa. (R. 
410, 411). (See Plaintiff's Requested Instruction attached 
hereto as Addendum 1.) The trial court judge unjustifiably 
refused the instructions. 
The Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985), this court 
relaxed the LSL§ i££S standard stating: 
Something less than exclusive control of the 
instrumentality causing damage may be suffi-
cient if evidence demonstrates the probability 
that defendant was responsible for damage. 
Id. at 721. Res ipsa may be used even where defendant claims not 
to have knowledge of what caused plaintiff's injury. Herein, as 
in BallQw, defendants claim not to know exactly how the cow 
escaped the corral, i.e. whether the wire came lose or broke (R. 
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591, 596, 598). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, which is required in LS& ipsa cases, plaintiffs 
was entitled to the res ipsa instruction* Anderton vs. 
Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Dtah 1980) at 833. 
Under similar facts, a sister court held that, although res 
iefija loquitur did not apply to every case where a cow escapes from 
an enclosed area and enters a public highway, the jury could 
reasonably have concluded that cows normally could not escape from 
the enclosure if the gate was securely locked. Watzig v. Tobin, 
642 P.2d 651 (OR 1982). The court emphasized that: 
[T]he conclusion which must be drawn to render 
the doctrine applicable is not whether a cow 
can escape such an enclosure, but rather 
whether a jury reasonably could find, under 
the evidence, that it is more probable than 
not that the escape of the cow would not 
normally occur in the absence of negligence 
and that the negligence was that of the 
defendant. 
Id. at 655. Interestingly, the court further held that plaintiff 
would not need an expert to testify that these kinds of accidents 
do not commonly happen in the absence of a defendants negligence. 
Id. at 655. 
In this case we have more evidence than the "mere" escape of 
defendants1 cow. We have evidence of a loading procedure which 
was fraught with problems which allegedly caused the cow's 
escape: the uninspected bailing wire (R. 600); an ineffective 
hook that will "pop off" when hit (R. 594, 595); a chute-trailer 
not backed up to a chute (R. 557) ; the use of an inexperienced 
16-year old boy to load (R. 602, 606). 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
JURY ON NEGLIGENCE PER SE. 
The violation of a statutory duty or municipal ordinance 
designed to protect a person claiming to be injured by reason of 
its violation is negligence per se. 57 Am* Jur. 2d, Negligencer 
§239 (p. 622). The effect of establishing liability from breach 
of such a statutory duty is that such liability may not be escaped 
by proof that the breaching defendant has exercised due care. 
In the exercise of its broad, general welfare powers, Salt 
Lake County enacted a highway ordinance entitled, "Unattended 
Animals on Highway Prohibited", Section 10-10-3. This ordinance 
in pertinent part is as follows: 
Every person . . . herding . . . or allowing 
to run at large, or causing to be . . . 
herded . . . or allowed to run at large, any 
. . . cow . . . upon any of the public 
highways of the county shall be guilty of 
misdemeanor. (See ordinance in its entirety 
as Addendum 2 hereto.) 
The trial court judge erred in refusing plaintiff's instruc-
tion regarding the Salt Lake County ordinance, and negligence pex 
,s.e. (R. 395, 397.) These instructions were entirely substantiated 
by the evidence in this case. The defendants, by various state-
ments, admitted that after the cow had escaped and already run 
across the public highway (2820 South) one time, they intended to 
herd the cow back across 2820 South to Mr. Sutton1s property. Mr. 
Giblett was following the cow on foot to "return it to its home 
corral11. (R. 647.) Defendants Mary and John Sutton "had separate 
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vehicles and drove along 2820 South Street prepared to herd the 
animal back into the Sutton corral . . . ". (Emphasis added.) 
Kelly Nielsen, Mr. Sutton's 16-year-old helper, chased the cow 
with Mr. Giblett. (R. 602, 606.) Mr. Sutton's intent was to 
"direct the cow down the road" and back into his place (R.584) 
through the gate which he intentionally left open for that purpose 
(after the cow had escaped) (R. 581). 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE A STRICT LIABILITY 
INSTRUCTION IN THIS CASE. 
All courts adhere to the common principle of law that an 
owner of a domestic animal is liable for injuries caused by the 
animal if the animal has a dangerous or vicious tendency, the 
owner had knowledge of the animal's dangerous or vicious tendency, 
such as would put a reasonable person on guard, and the owner 
neglects to act to prevent the risk of damage. Rest_atemen_t 
(Second) of Tort, Section 509. 
A cow is considered a "domestic" animal for purposes of 
strict liability. Vigue v. Noyes, 550 P.2d 234 (Az. 1976). The 
owner is "bound to keep such an animal secured at his peril 
and the fact that it escapes does not relieve him from liabilities 
inflicted." (Emphasis added.) ££}• at 236. One court considered 
a horse to have a "propensity to be dangerous" when it bolted (two 
times) when heading for an alfalfa field, thus throwing its rider. 
Macho v. Mahowald, 374 NW2d 312 (Minn. App. 1985). 
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One previous incident of dangerous propensity is enough 
to take a case involving injury, allegedly inflicted by an animal, 
to the jury under the doctrine of harboring an animal with a 
dangerous propensity. Flynn v. Lindenfield, 433 P.2d 639 (AZ 
1967) • 
Based on these authorities, the trial court judge's refusal 
to give the requested instruction on strict liability was 
reversible error, (R. 411), (See Plaintiff's Requested Instruc-
tion No. 25 attached hereto as Addendum 6.) Even if the defend-
ants were not at fault for the escape of the cow, their knowledge 
of its propensity to escape its confines renders them strictly 
liable for harm to the plaintiff. It was defendant Giblett's 
testimony that he maintained all four sides of the LDS Church 
pasture, and that it contained 81 head of cattle (R. 415), and 
this was the first time he had had any cows escape from this LDS 
Church property before this incident. (R. 677.) This substan-
tiates that this "renegade" cow is abnormal. None of the wit-
nesses could fully explain how this cow escaped. (R. 624.) But, 
it is inferred from Mr. Giblett's insistence the fence was 
properly maintained, that the cow must have jumped over it. (R. 
667, 624.) Mr. Giblett believed that this cow had jumped the 
fence again after the accident. (R. 666.) 
Thus, the propensity of this particular animal to escape was 
within the knowledge of the defendants. In spite of its renegade 
nature, they took no extra precautions to keep it confined during 
loading. Even immediately before the critical escape, Mr. Sutton 
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and Mr, Nielson, noticed that the animal was nervous, running 
about and excited, (R. 556, 608,) 
Their lack of care is exemplified by the following: 
(1) The gate accessing the public highway was left open 
(R. 553) ; 
(2) A chain link fencing which is inadequate to 
contain cattle was used when alternatives such as a 
solid piece of a gate blocked with a piece of board 
could have been used. (R. 705.); 
(3) Bailing wire twisted four times was used as a latch 
when it was known that twisting the wire would cause it to 
weaken. (R. 708, 710, 712.) The more logical alternative 
latching system should have been a chain. 
(4) They relied on leaning the corral gate against the 
trailer knowing that a cow hitting it would move it, allowing an 
escape (R. 709); and 
(4) They allowed an inexperienced 16-year old to assist in 
loading a skittish, 700-pound animal (R. 602, 606). 
All of these facts support the appellant's contention that 
the trial court should have given the strict liability instruction 
as requested. 
CONCLOSION 
The jury verdict in this case resulted from a number of 
errors by the trial court each of which individually constitute 
reversible error. Taken together, they also created an atmosphere 
that deprived plaintiffs of a fair trial. The fact that the jury 
16 
found defendant zero (0%) percent negligent under the facts of 
this case, reflects the biased circumstances in which this 
case was tried. Appellant respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the judgment herein and remand this case for a new trial 
with appropriate instructions to the trial court* 
DATED this day of May, 1986. 
BLACK & MOORE 
/James R. Black 
&L 
Mary A. Rudolph 
LAURA L. BOYER 
/ & 
Laura L. Boyer 
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ADDENDUM 1 
INSTRUCTION NO. ? V 
Our law recognizes a doctrine known as res ipsa 
loquitur which m e a n s : The thing speaks for itself. By reason 
of it, under certain c i r c u m s t a n c e s , one who is injured may hold 
another responsible without showing the exact conduct of the 
other party that caused or set in motion the act that caused 
the injury. The doctrine of law may be applied only under 
special c i r c u m s t a n c e s , they being as f o l l o w s : 
First: That the bailing wire that came undone, allowing 
the cow's e s c a p e , which proximately caused the injury to the 
plaintiff, James Hornsby, was in the possession and exclusive 
control of the d e f e n d a n t s , John Sutton and Charles Gilett, and 
it appears that the injury resulted from some act or omission 
in the manner in which said defendants m a i n t a i n e d , tied, and/or 
secured; or exercised due care in the tying/securing of said 
bailing wire to the trailer gate. 
Second: That the incident was one of such nature as does 
not or would not have happened in the ordinary course of 
t h i n g s , if those who have control of or are responsible for the 
securing of the bailing wire to the corral gate, use ordinary 
c a r e . 
Third: That the circumstances surrounding the causing of 
the occurrence were such that the plaintiff is not in a 
position to know what specific conduct or act or omission or 
failure to act, was the cause, whereas the def^n^ a n*'* bem.3 
those in charge of securing said bailing wire to the corral 
g a t e , may be reasonably expected to know, and thus to be able 
to explain their lack of negligence. 
If you find all of the above conditions to exist, 
they may give rise -to an inference by you that the defendants, 
John Sutton and Charles Gillett, were negligent, which 
inference will support a verdict for the plaintiff, in the 
absence of evidence of non-negligence on the part of the 
def e n d a n t s . 
White v, Pinney, 99 U. 484, 108 P2d 249 (1940) 
ADDENDUM 2 
Sec. 10-10-3. Unattended Animals on Highway 
Prohibited* Every person staking, tethering, 
herding, grazing or pasturing, or allowing to 
run at large or causing to be staked, 
tethered, herded, grazed or pastured, or 
allowed to run at large, any horse, cow, 
mule, sheep, goat or swine, or other animal 
upon any of the public highways of the county 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
ADDENDUM 3 
t M S Y H O C T l Q H H O . ff> 
You are instructed that ~~ ?rdinanc? of the County of 
Salt Lake (Sec. 10-10-3) provides that herding, or allowing live-
stock to run at large, or cause to be herded or allowed to run at 
large upon any public highway of the County, shall be guilty of a 
mi sdemeanor» 
The violation of this ordinance is negligence per se* 
Under the negligence per se do c t r i n e , the violation of such a 
statute gives rise to a presumption of negligence in the absence 
of justification or excuse, provided that the plaintiff suffering 
the injury is a member of the class of persons for whose protec-
tion the statute was adopted, i.e. a motorist. 
]f yr»«» -'•p.-- **** »r»w r\-f t h ^  c*of°ndant** her01** */•»«-»!
 arort 
this County ordinance just read to y o u , and that such violation 
was a proximate cause of injury to James Hornsby, you will find 
that such violation was negl i g e n c e , unless such defendant(s) prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that s/he had an excuse or a 
justification in not complying with the County ordinance. 
ADDENDUM 4 
Undc~ "h~ County ordinance just ^ead to y c - , 11 is rot 
necessary for you to find that the person who herded, or allowed, 
the cow to run at large was the cow's owner, because the County 
ordinance prohibits "every" person from that conduct. 
Under this County ordinance, despite the fact that John 
Sutton and/or Mary Lee Sutton, did not own the cow in question, if 
you find that by their actions they violated the County ordinance, 
then that violation will constitute negligence per se. 
Misterek v. Washington Mineral Products, 531 P2d 805, 
85 Wash- 2d 166 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . 
ADDENDUM 5 
INSTRUCTION NO. *f 
In the County ordinance just read to you the phrase 
"allowing" to run at large implies knowledge, consent, or willin-
ness or such negligent conduct as is equivalent thereto on the 
part of the owner that the animals be at large. 
State v. D P * * \ ^ « o?d 8<^ Q6 w 2 S h . ?d 652 (1 Q81) • 
ADDENDUM 6 
INSTRUCTION NO- :b 
The owner/keeper of domestic animals is bound to take 
notice of propensities of class to which it belongs and any 
particular propensities peculiar to the animal itself of which he 
is put on notice, and insofar as those propensities are likely to 
cause injury, must exercise reasonable care to guard against it. 
An owner of a domestic animal, that is aware of one 
prior dangerous propensity, will be held strictly liable, regard-
less of any fault on his part, for injuries caused to another 
person as a result of this dangerous propensity. 
Strict liability on the owner of a cow or horse may be 
imposed where the owner has reason to know, Drior to the damaap-
causing event, that the animal had a dangerous propensity abnor-
mal to its class. 
If you find that the defendants, Sutton and Giblett, 
knew of the dangerous propensity of this cow, i.e. its wild nature 
so as to escape its confines and roam, then said defendants should 
be held liable for damages caused by the escaped cow, regardless 
of their fault in allowing said damage-causing escape. 
Vigue v. No.yes, 550 P2d 234, 113 Az 237 (1976); Flynn v. 
Lindenfield, 433 P2d 639, 6 Az App 459 (1967); Fernan-
dez v- Marks, 642 P2d 542, 3 Haw App 12 ( 1 9 8 2 ) . 
ADDENDUM 7 
f- • r_-> i;, I^__"T;H- ^  CFF'CT 
Allen M. Swan, A3165 
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Attorneys for 
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Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES N. HORNSBY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a 
Utah corporation sole, CHARLES 
GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON AND MARY 
LEE SUTTON, and DOES I through 
X, Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
Civil No. -G-&5^5QT3-
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
C % 3 - &d>/9 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District Judge, commencing 
Tuesday the 29th day of October, 1985 and continuing through 
Friday the 1st day of November, 1985, Laura L. Boyer appearing 
for plaintiff, Allen M. Swan of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
appearing for defendants Corporation of the Presiding Bishop 
of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Charles 
Giblett and Stephen G. Morgan of Morgan, Scalley & Reading 
appearing for defendants John Sutton and Mary Lee Sutton 
and testimony having been adduced and argument of counsel 
ion, McConkl* 
A 8u«hn«<l 
o*«a»on«i Cocootal*oo | 
30 S 300 PAST 
(*QQ4£~ 
heard and the matter having been submitted to the jury on 
a Special Verdict and the jury having returned its Special 
Verdict finding that the plaintiff, James Hornsby, was negligent 
and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident 
and finding that none of the defendants were negligent, now 
therefore it is hereby 
ORDERED that judgment enter on the verdict in favor 
of each of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause 
of action together with defendants1 costs incurred herein 
in the sum of $7* ** ^ ^ ^ L f V . _ 
DATED this / / day of Novemb 
ATTEST 
H. DtXON HtNDLBY 
By Doputv Clefk 
Served by mailing copies this day of November, 
1985, to Laura L. Boyer, 3167 West 4700 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84118 and to Stephen G. Morgan, 261 East 300 South, 
2nd Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
//V&*. yy\y6>ujt^ 
Allen 'M. Swan 
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ADDENDUM 8 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES HORNSBY and 
NANETTE MAILY HORNSBY, his wife, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs,
 m CIVIL NO. C-83-5019 
vs . 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS : 
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah corporation, sole, et al.," 
Defendants. : 
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the part of the 
defendants asking the Court to dismiss the -claims for loss of 
consortium, together with the defendant Church and Giblett's Motion 
in Limine seeking to restrict evidence regarding an earlier 
alleged negligent act came before the Court for hearing, together 
with all parties Motion to Continue the Trial Date, and plaintiffs1 
Motion to Amend. The Court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their 
Complaint to set forth additional claims of negligence, and to join 
an additional party defendant. The Court after discussion with 
counsel also agreed to strike the trial date currently scheduled 
for August 28, 1984, and continue this matter without trial date 
until such time as one of the parties at their option files a 
supplemental Certification of Readiness for Trial. The Court 
oool-
3pr:n3gf7TP*_ &T JUL, * K 2 TWO »«3W8rj«©C9f DCCXS2CS1 
granted the defendants' Motion regarding the plaintiffs1 claims for 
loss of consortium, and took the question of defendants1 Motion in 
Limine under advisement for further consideration. 
Upon reviewing the file and considering carefully the issues 
of proximate cause, independent intervening proximate cause, and 
foreseeablility, the Court declines at this point in time to 
grant the defendants1 Motion in Limine restricting evidence that may 
pertain to alleged negligent conduct on the part of the defendant 
Church regarding its fences approximately a month prior to the date 
the animal in question escaped. The Court is unable to rule as a 
matter of law at the present time regarding the question of proximate 
cause and foreseeability, keeping in mind that such issues are 
normally reserved for a jury in cases of negligence such as the one 
before the Court. 
Counsel for the plaintiffs is to prepare an Order setting forth 
the Court's decision as contained in this Memorandum Decision 
dealing with plaintiffs1 Motion to Amend, the continuance of the 
trial date, and the defendants1 Motion in Limine. Counsel for the 
defendant Church is requested to prepare any<5rder setting forth the 
Court's ruling dismissing the plaintiffs/ claim for loss of consortium 
Dated this /J day of July, 1/84 lis
 JL 
^IMCTHY^R. HANSON 
)ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H.WXONHINW*' 
^ J t l *———5^7c*rtT 
c i - .nO!-
n a e r a m mjs&rr*. *rr A^. ?AGS gwHauE. HHMOHAJcmrH D S C I S I O H 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this / O day of July, 1984: 
Laura L. Boyer 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3167 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Allen M. Swan 
Attorney for Defendant 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Attorney for Defendant Sutton 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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